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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
An Analysis of Alternative Regimes
Marcus H. MILLER*
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL and CEPR, UK
John WILLIAMSON*
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC 20036, USA
This is an exercise in the positive economics of alternative monetary regimes. The behavior of
output and prices is compared using a stochastic specification which allows asymptotic variances
to be obtained without difficulty. Free floating of exchange rates together with national money
supply targets is analyzed first, with and without the presence of 'fads' in the exchange rate. Two
alternatives for monetary coordination are then considered. First is McKinnon's proposal to fix
nominal exchange rates and stabilize aggregate monetary growth (or average inflation); second is
Williamson's system of target zones for stable real exchange rates, complemented by Ilominal
income targets for fiscal policy.
1. Introduction
At the beginning of the 1970s the OECD countries were on a de facto
Dollar Standard, in which the U.S. selected its monetary policy with a view
to domestic stability and other countries pegged to the dollar, with the right
to change the peg at their unilateral discretion. By 1973, however, the Dollar
Standard had collapsed, giving way to a regime of floating exchange rates
coupled with national money supply targets, a regime long advocated by
Milton Friedman [see for example, his influential papers on flexible exchange
rates (1953) and monetary targets (1968)].
Since the Plaza Agreement of September 1985, however, the U.S.A. has
made the external value of the dollar an explicit target of policy. The
coordination of international macroeconomic policies has been sought in
order to help secure a reduction of its external deficit. These developments
prompt two questions - first,is a change in the international monetary
*Thanks are due to David Currie and his colleagues for use of the PRISM programme and to
M. Emadi-Moghadam for his expertise in running it. The paper has benefited considerably from
comments made at the International Seminar on Macroeconomics, particularly those of Stan
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system really called for rather than simply a change in, for example, U.S.
fiscal policy; and, second, if so, what are the alternatives?
It is not the purpose of the present paper to debate the first question with
those who maintain 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it', as the case for reform of
the system has been developed in some detail elsewhere [see Williamson
(1985)]. What we offer instead, on the second question, is a simple exercise in
positive economics in which the floating rate regime of 1973-85 is compared
with alternatives.
The alternatives considered are indicated in table1,which classifies
monetary systems on two criteria, whether they are hegemonic or not, and
how exchange rates are determined. Thus the international system prevailing
from 1973 to 1985 appearing in the first column is classified as 'symmetric',
in contrast to the hegemony under the Dollar Standard, which appears in
the second row of the second column.
The focus of this paper is on regimes without hegemony. The alternatives
to floating with monetary targets that are considered are, first, McKinnon's
proposals for fixed exchange rates, and, second, Williamson's system of target
zones for real exchange rates.
McKinnon's proposal of 1984 was designed both to ensure symmetry in the
operation of the international monetary system and to put the control of
inflation on an explicitly monetarist footing. The plan was to have three key-
currency members (U.S.A., Germany and Japan) agree a target for their
combined monetary growth, which was to be pursued under fixed exchange
rates by national DCE targets and symmetrical non-sterilised intervention.
McKinnon's confidence that the variations of velocity observed atthe
national level were due to currency substitution and so would cancel out at
the global level (and be adequately neutralised by the intervention policy)
was challenged ex ante [Dornbusch (1983)] and has also been eroded by
subsequent experience. As a result McKinnon has, in a later version of his
proposal (1986), shifted to the 'classical' position that monetary policy at the
global level should aim directly at price stability, rather than at the control
Table 1
International monetary systems compared.
Floating rates
with national
money supply Fixed exchange Managed exchange
targets rates rates
Symmetry OECD McKin non's Williamson's
1973-85 proposals target zones
Hegemony Dollar standard EMS
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of a monetary aggregate. McKinnon has thus addressed two issues arising
under fixed exchange rates, how to make the determination of monetary
policy more symmetric and subsequently how to cope with the observed
instability in the demand for money.
Under neither of McKinnon's proposals do the mechanisms which keep
inflation at bay at a national level involve control of a domestic monetary
aggregate. In the absence of portfolio shocks monetary policy will require
keeping interest rates in line with those elsewhere (and controlling domestic
credit expansion in the first case). The mechanisms are rather the longer run
effect on expectations of belonging to such a currency union, together with
the immediate impact of union wide interest rates, and more directly the
impact on trade and employment of allowing prices to rise relative to those
in partner countries. With nominal exchange rates fixed, inflation differentials
will change real exchange rates in ways which shift demand from inflationary
countries towards non-inflationary countries (while the level of the 'global'
interest rate will act so as to stabilise inflation in the union as a whole).
Under the regime of floating-with-money-supply-targets the experience of
the U.S. and the U.K. was not that the nominal exchange rate simply
adjusted to offset inflationary differentials so as to keep real exchange rates
fairly stable (as Friedman had implied would be the case) but that real
exchange rates showed prolonged deviations frrom equilibrium ('misalign-
ments'). Itis this feature that Williamson's target zones are designed to
remedy: on the assumption that fiscal policy is not allowed to crowd out the
desired (high employment) balance of payments, domestic interest rates (and
foreign currency intervention) are to be aimed at keeping the real exchange
rate within a band of ±10% of the equilibrium level implied by the balance
of payments target.
Williamson's plan resembles McKinnon's proposal in assigning domestic
monetary policy to an external objective; in this case, however, the require-
ment to stabilise the real exchange rate will in the absence of portfolio
shocks require real interest rates to be kept reasonably in line with those in
partner countries. This policy assignment has been severely criticised by
Adams and Gros (1986) for leaving domestic inflation out of control. As we
show below, however, the combination of assigning monetary policy to this
external objective and fiscal policy to a domestic money income target is not
open to this criticism - indeed, at a formal level, the mechanism for checking
domestic inflation resembles that which operates under the McKinnon plan.
At a global level there is a good deal in common between the Williamson
and McKinnon plans. Whereas McKinnon proposed that 'global' interest
rates be set so as to stabilise aggregate money or aggregate prices, the
proposal in Edison, Miller and Williamson (1987) is that nominal income be
the target.
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have created a regional monetary system (EMS) with agreed nominal parities,
which have, however, been adjusted cx post to accommodate most of the
inflation differentials emerging between them. It has recently been argued by
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1987) that the EMS is in effect a regional currency
standard, a hegemony led by Germany, with limited independence permitted
by extensive capital controls in France and Italy, so it is entered in the
second row of table 1. The EMS, as such, is not analysed in this paper,
because it is not symmetric.
2. The framework of anaIyss
The formal framework used to assess alternative proposals is a simple two
bloc model with goods prices which adjust more slowly than the exchange
rate which is determined by rational expectations in the foreign exchange
market [cf. Dornbusch (1976)]. Inflation expectations are captured simply by
augmenting the Phillips curve by terms measuring long-run inflation under
the regime in question [cf. Buiter and Miller (1981)]. The formal analysis of
the two country, floating rate case is essentially that developed in Miller
(1982) to which 'fads', as Poterba and Summers (1987) describe them, have
been added, while treatment of the fixed rate case is derived from Buiter
(1986). The stochastic specification closely follows recent contributions by
Fukuda and Hamada (1986) and Aoki (1987), and we are grateful to have
had access to the PRISM package developed by David Currie and his
colleagues for the stochastic analysis.
Inthis paper we make use of asymptotic or steady-state variances
(obtained under the assumption of rational expectations) to study the
performance of monetary and fiscal policy rules without falling foul of the
Lucas critique, as advocated by John Taylor (1985) in an earlier issue of this
Review.For a comprehensive stochastic treatment of various monetary policy
rules - chosen optimally but subject to a 'time consistency' constraint - the
reader is referred to McKibbin and Sachs (1986).
The equations which constitute the model are listed in detail in table 2,
and the notation is given in table 3. The structure is doubtless familiar so it
can be quickly summarised. First comes the condition for moneymarket
equilibrium (the LM curves) which are subject to stochastic serially uncor-
related disturbances Em,8(asterisks are used to denote variables involving
the foreign country). Output in each country depends on the cx ante real
interest rate, the real exchange rate, fiscal stance, output overseas and a
stochastic shock (se, s'). As shown in the third line, inflation reflects domestic
demand pressure and also long run inflation expectations under the regime
in question (represented by the term it). The inflation process is also subject
to white noise c,,, t.
The specification of the foreign currency arbitrage condition contains a
novelty as the usual assumption of 'uncovered interest parity' is modified soM.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 283
Table 2
Model equations.'
1-tome country Foreign country
Money mp--kyAi+e,,,
Goodsy= yE[r]+5c+s+iy+eg yt= yE[r5]-5c+s5+iy+c
PricesDp=4y+ir+e Dp5=çby5+n5+e
Currency arbitrage E[De]i - i + E[Df]




'Strictly speaking solutions of stochastic differential equations have no deriva-
tives so the use of the differential operators is inadmissable. Nevertheless for linear
systems with constant coefficients, asymptotic moments can be obtained by
treating the system as ifit were continuously differentiable [see, for example,
Jazwinsky (1970, Chapter 4)].
that expected changes in the nominal exchange rate are set equal to the
interest differential plus the change in an exogenous, autoregressive 'fad'. The
idea comes fromn Poterba and Summers (1987) who show that the existence
of such 'fads' is consistent with the behaviour of U.S. stock prices. Adding
such a 'coloured noise' process to the arbitrage equation violates the usual
assumption of market efficiency - but, as Poterba and Summers also show,
the tests used (successfully) to establish market efficiency have very low
power against such fads.
Since the parameters in each country are identical, the dynamic (and
stochastic) analysis can be conducted separately in terms of 'averages' and
'differences' [cf. Aoki (1981)]. The global economy (averages) looks like a
closed economy, see table 3(a), and does not involve the exchange rate. The
latter is determined only by the system of differences given in table 3(b).
While it may seem rather contrived to work in terms of these artificial
variables, the gain in analytical simplification makes it worthwhile. We look
first at the global economy (in the next section) before going on to examine
the determination of exchange rates, inflation, etc. under the three alternative
regimes.
3. The global economy
Thanks to the assumption of symmetry, the analysis of global aggregates is




Goods y,, = - yE[r,,]+ 25c + sd 'jy,, + g
Prices Dp=4ya+ira+r
Arbitrage E{De] = ja - clif
Fad Df=lif+w
where E[ra] = iE[Dp]= - 'bYaitd
c= e - Pa






y real output, measured relative to capacity (in logs)
short term nominal interest rate
E[r]ex ante short term real interest rate,iE[Dp]
r ex post real interest rate,iDp
c real exchange rate in logs,(e + p - p):increase indicates higher
competitiveness for home country
s index of fiscal stance, scaled to have unit effect on log output
p domestic price index, in logs
m money supply, in logs
n nominal income target, in logs
it 'augmentation' term systematically affecting price changes f 'fad' [see Poterba and Summers (1987)]





= 1 '(p. ++ ë,,, me)
Goods y=
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(3)
given that the shocks are independent. The speed ofadjustment, PS,
appearing here is found from table 4, column 2. Note that the varianceof
price includes the variance of velocity multiplied by half thisspeed of
adjustment.
The results so obtained for a money supply target are easilymodified to
reflect a change of target variable. For convenience we assumethat the
McKinnon price level target is forstableprices and Williamson's is forstable
nominal income - and take the growth of potential GNP to be zero. Now
the rules for interest rate setting involved in pursuing these targets canbe
written as simplified versions of the inverted LM curve used above;specifi-
cally McKinnon II:=IIMPa, i.e., k=O, 2PM and is omitted, and
Williamson: laJiw(Pa+Ya), i.e., k=1,2=fland is omitted.
These parameter substitutions will alter the speed of adjustment and the
term '-ta appearing in eq. (3), but one can see that boththese rules, like
McKinnon's monetarist rule, involve a feedback of interest rates on the price
level (the integral of past inflation). But they omit the 'noise' caused byusing
money supply targets to achieve this feedback(as a,,, is omitted).
proposed as guidelines for world monetary policy, starting with the world
money supply targetma, growing at the rate jt,, (McKinnon).
Substituting world interest rates ifrom the first line of table 3(a) into the
world IS curve of line two we obtain
ya=(_y_1pa+y_'m5+ Yl1a+SaY'm+ffg), (1)
wherehla1 +''kcb2t, andlEahas been set equal toitaas in Buiter
and Miller (1981), i.e., the inflation process is
DPa'4Ya+Ua+tp. (2)
To simplify matters a little we set ma=a=sa=O,i.e.,the world money
stock is fixed and fiscal policy 'neutral', so output is determinedonly by
prices and aggregate shocks to velocity and demand, as shown in the top
row of table4. On combining this with the inflation process (2),the














Determinants of output (y) and the speed of adjustment (p).1
Output Speed of adjusment
y,-'p,, y2 '+ ëg)
1+25O)pdY2'êfl,+g)
Yd1(2tPd+Cg)
Yd =4;;; ( -(25 + 'a)Pa + l)
Ya-°Pd + g)
'The denominators (indicated by A,A1,...) in the first column are given in detail in the
second column. The 'speed of adjustment' refers to p,, the stable root characteristic of the
system averages or differences for the regime in question.
4. Floating with national monetary targets
In this section we analyse the behaviour of the real exchange rate when
each country adopts a fixed target growth rate for its money supply (not
necessarily the same) and allows its currency to float freely. With identical
coefficients in the separate national economies, the exchange rate depends
only on 'differences', including the differences of shocks (denotedm, p
where= s,,, -), together with the fad process
On the assumption that the 'augmentation' term in the price equation is
the domestic rate of monetary growth, i.e.,
Dp=4y+J1+eandDp*=çby*+,2*+a, then
Dpd = 4Yd + j +,andE[Dpd] =cbYd+ /1j. (4)
Since inflation (and the inflation differential) may persist, it is convenient
to deflate each nominal money stock by the domestic price level, so l=mp,
l*=m*_p* andld=l_l*.As the evolution of real balances depends on the
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The behaviour of the real exchange ratereflects both the inflation
differential and the determinants of the nominal exchange rate. So, using eq.
(4) again, we find (on taking expectations of both sides) that as
Dc =De+Dp* Dp so E[Dc] =E[id] p/if cbE[yd] (6)
Eqs. (5) and (6) show the evolution of real balances (id) and the real
exchange rate (c) depend on both income and interest differentials. Solving
for the latter (using the goods and money market relationships from table
3(b)) and adding the autoregressive fad process
Df=*f+w (7)
yields the stochastic differential equations for this regime, as follows:
Did14' 24%5 0
E[Dc]j=1+2(4k)Ali c
Df o o - Lf
0)
where zl = - ky - )( 1 - 4y + ) and is assumed to be negative, and Sd = 0.
Since the nominal exchange rate is a forward looking variable, stable
behaviour is observed only on the stable manifold (i.e., the subspace of this
system associated wth the stable roots which we denote as p and -k/i).The
stable dynamics of this system and the role played by the serially correlated
fads in changing the more orthodox account is most easily seen from fig. 1.
In the absence of fads, the dynamics of adjustment in this Dornbusch-style
model would lie on the line marked SS in this figure. Where there is
'overshooting', the slope of this line will be greater than one - since a shock
to the money stock will have a greater than unit effect on theexchange rate
[cf. Dornbusch (1976, Appendix)].
However, the serial correlation of the fad process adds another stable root,
and (in the diagrammatically convenient case where -i/i=p5) the stable
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ccompetitiveness
D/, = 0
Fig. 1. 'Fads', dynamics and asymptotic probability contours.
These trajectories are symmetric around the origin but not around SS. The
reason is that a fad which by raising the value of the domestic currency cuts
competitiveness (so that c lies beneath SS) slows down the adjustment of real
balances towards the origin, while a fad which increases competitiveness
(putting c above SS) gives rise to forces which speed up the adjustment of 1d
towards equilibrium.
Also shown in the figure is an (asymptotic) probability contour, showing
points of equal probability in the long run. As the orientation of the ellipse
demonstrates, the pattern of correlation between 'd and c arising from such
fads is negative. The reason is made clear by observing that from a point
such as A a large part of the subsequent expected trajectory is in the North
West quadrant, and conversely for movements from point B; which orientsMR. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 289
the ellipse in the fashion shown. (This negative correlation appears to be
independentofthe respective sizesof and I'I.)
In the absenceoffads, the probability distributionofoutcomes for c andid
lies along the stable manifold (and the isoprobability 'contours' become two
points on SS). Under the convenient assumption that the ratesofmonetary
growth are thesame (sowe can write j =m,= 0) then'd = - Pdand on the
stable manifold, c =61d= -6Pd, i.e.,competitiveness is simply relative prices
multiplied by the coefficient 6 (which measures the degreeofovershooting).
Under these assumptions the determination of output is shown in line 2 of
table 4 and the formulae of annex 1 may be used to calculate asymptotic
moments.
As was observed earlier the regime of floating with money supply targets
led to much greater fluctuations in real exchange rates than many economists
had expected. The above account is inevitably something of a caricature, but
it suffices to show how the combination of sluggish prices, shocks to the
economy and inefficiency in the foreign exchange market is inprinciple
capable of generating substantial fluctuations in the real exchange rates.
5. Fixed exchange rates
The combination of a fixed exchange rate regime wth perfect capital
mobility is usually taken to ensure that nominal interest rates are equalised
across countries, which would meaneliminatingthe fad process included
earlier to characterise the behaviour of the floating exchange rate. Of course,
if the fad were to be treated as a phenomenon which has nothing to do with
the exchange rate regime per se - but is for example a 'safe-haven' portfolio
shift - then it would be perfectly possible to incorporate the effects of such
fads on interestdifferentialsunder fixed exchange rates.For present
purposes, however, we assume that the fad is eliminated by the change of
regime.
Under a fixed rate regime, 'competitiveness' is measured by the ratio of
nominalprices, cm p*- p = -Pd'anditsevolutionreflectsdifferential
inflation. Under the assumption, which seems reasonable in this context, that
the augmentation termltdwill also go to zero the inflation differential is as in
eq. (4) above, except that ltd=O [cf. Buiter (1986)].
The determination of output differences (after substitutions reflecting the
assumption of zero interest differentials, constant nominal exchange rate and
the inflation process) is given in the line labelled for McKinnon in table 4.
Using the values for A2 and p shown there, the asymptotic variance of the
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Thus the real exchange rate depends on shocks to the goods market and
on differential inflation shocks, but not on the money market disturbances
represented bym,which are accommodated so as to keep interest rates
equalised. What keeps relative prices in line in the long run - and so keeps
the asymptotic variance of the real rate from diverging - is the negative
feedback effect of past inflation differentials on the current output and
inflation differentials; the country which has had more inflationisless
competitive and loses demand for that reason.
It is of course possible to include in addition a fiscal policy response to
external developments. Thus if
Sd= -= - --PYd),
where B is the balance of trade, the parameters are modified as shown on the
next line of table 4, labelled 'McKinnon with fiscal activism'.
6. Stable real exchange rates with domestic nominal income targets
Finally we turn to the case where real exchange rates are stabilised, and
fiscal policy used to support the anti-inflationary stance of policy. For
reasons discussed earlier, we treat the fad as a characteristic of free floating
which disappears withthe change of regime.(Once again,however,
behaviour of this sort which reflects portfolio shifts can if necessary be
included). We consider in detail a regime where the real exchange rate is kept
constant; this is, of course, a limiting case since Williamson's target zones are
20% wide. Nevertheless it is of interest in view of the argument that limiting
movements in the real rate will necesarily destabilise inflation [see Adams
and Gros (1986)].
Assume firstthat nominal interestdifferentialsareset equal to the
anticipated inflation differential (reducing to zero the ex ante real interest
differential), i.e.,
(10)
Let fiscal policy be used to pursue a nominal income target (n, n*) with fiscal
stance being adjustedinproportion tothe deviation from target,i.e,
s = - o(p + y - n), s" = - a(p* + yn*), so
Sd= o(Pd+Ydna).
The nominal income targets are designed to accommodate non-inflationary
potential income growth; as we are, for simplicity, ignoring the growth of
potential output in this paper, the two targetsnandnwill be constant (and
their difference nd can be set to zero by choice of units). For the same reason,M.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 291
the term lEd appearing in (10) can be set to zero, just as in McKinnon's
monetary union - except here itis the commitment to nominal income
targets that isto achieve thisresult. Relative output demand is usually
affected by the (ex ante) real interest differential and the real exchange rate.
But the former is zero (by assumption); and the latter will also be constant
(as a corollary). The argument is simply that the real rate differs from
equilibrium by the integral of expected future real interest differentials, which
are set to zero by policy.
So relative output depends only on relative prices and demand shocks as
shown in the last row of table 4, which is formally very similar to the
preceding calculations for the fixed nominal exchange rate, the main differ-
ence being that here only relative fiscal stance and not the real exchange
responds to past inflation differentials (represented in integral form byPd).
Since the inflation process is unchanged, the formula for the unconditional
variance of inflation will be as for (9) above, except that now p = - 4w/A3
and L13=1+a+J.
How can one square the striking correspondence between the output and
inflation behaviour and that derived for McKinnon's monetary union (where
surely inflation was under control) with the basic conclusion of Adams and
Gros (that assigning monetary policy to real things destabilises inflation)?
The answer lies in the fact that, in the extended target zone system being
analysed here, a fiscal policy rule is used in conjunction with the monetary
policy assignment. If this is deleted, so a goes to zero, then indeed the
asymptotic variance will go to infinity - the Adams and Gros point.
7. Summary and conclusions
When the Dollar Standard came to an end, macroeconomic policy became
ipso facto more decentralised, and by and large policy-makers adopted
national monetary targets to fight inflation and floated exchange rates to
offset inflation differentials. But the velocity of money has proved highly
variable; and deviations from purchasing power parity have been both
pronounced and prolonged. The alternative systems examined here attempt
to cope with these developments.
In seeking to stabilise exchange rates, they seek to coordinate monetary
policy across countries, but without returning to a Dollar Standard. In
the belief that variations in velocity were due to 'currency substitution'
McKinnon initially proposed that the world interest rate be set so as to
attain an aggregate money supply target. Even inaggregate, however,
velocity has proved too fickle. Both McKinnon's revised plan to use the price
level as a target and Williamson's choice of nominal income are ways of
avoiding shocks to velocity while retaining the crucial monetarist principle
that monetary stringency be progressively increased in response to inflation.292 M.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system
At the national level McKinnon proposes to fix nominal exchange rates
while Williamson seeks to stabilise real exchange rates within a relatively
wide band: in neither case are monetary targets recommended. The adoption
of such policy rules may avoid the 'fads' which appear to characterise
floating exchange rates, although this is still an open question. Even aside
from this important issue, there are crucial differences between the regimes,
as illustrated for example in table 5, where the long-run variances of prices
and output - in the face of supply and demand disturbances - are shown for
various regimes. For brevity, we consider only the variances arising from
supply-side shocks, shown in columns (4) and (5) of the table. It is apparent
that, for the illustrative parameters used here, the product of price and
output variances is a constant in the face of supply-side shocks: the regimes
are 'trading off' variations in prices and output.
In row 1, one can see that for both a world money supply target as
originally proposed by McKinnon and for a global nominal income target
(pursued with an equally active use of interest rates), the variance of prices
exceeds that of output. (If one were to include shocks to the velocity of
money as well, they would increase the variances associated with the money
supplyrule,leaving those for the nominal income target unchanged).
However, targeting the price level directly, as McKinnon has more recently
recommended, does, even without fiscal activism, reduce price variance (see
row 2) - at the cost of higher output variance.
Turning now to the country-specific inflation shocks, one sees, in rows and
3 and 4, that the fluctuations in relative prices and of relative output levels
are much closer together. The reason isthat, in an open economy, the
movement of the real exchange rate adds an extra channel to monetary
policy. In addition to the direct effect of real interest rates on aggregate
demand, the real interest rate will influence the trade balance via its effect on
the real exchange rate. Interestingly, however, the 'gold standard' results
appearing in row 4 - where the country with high inflation sticks to a fixed
exchange rate and suffers a loss in competitiveness - are much the same as
those for free floating with money supply targets (in row 3). The intuitive
reason for this is that if, as here, the exchange rate does not significantly
'overshoot' under floating, and if the money target is constant, then the
floating nominal exchange rate will be pretty stable too - absent the 'fads'.
(In practice the variance of exchange rates seems to have exceeded what can
be explained in terms of variation in economic fundamentals: this is why we
have included'fads'intheforeign exchange market, which affect the
behaviour of the floating exchange rate but disappear when the rate is fixed
or managed.)
Under both these two regimes international competitiveness will fluctuate
as relative prices move but the nominal exchange rate remains stable. As can
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ness constant does stabilize output, but it means that pricesbecome more
volatile. Indeed, the outcomes begin to look more like those for the closed
economy - which makes sense as the monetary authorities are acting so as
to prevent real exchange rates from moving as they have in the previous two
cases.
In the remainder of the table the variances arising from demand shocks
are also shown for the several regimes. A more complete treatmentwould
of course include other shocks and a consideration of their joint distribution.
But this illustration gives some idea of the way in which the different
exchange rate regimes seek to spread the burden of checking supply side
inflation. [See also Frankel, 1983)].
The options with regard to exchange rate policy are no longer simply of
whether to use monetary policy so as to fix the exchange rate or to let it
float freely. This paper has shown that schemes to manage the exchange rate,
involving both monetary and fiscal policy, give distinct and equally coherent
answers to the issues involved in the choosing of an exchange regime.
Annex 1
Deriving the asymptotic moments for price and output
Given (1) y=(apb8m+eg),
so p = - a/A, then the asymptotic variance of price is
°2lI
{(b2m+ti2g)+tp}
= 2aA(b2a + tr) +2a
Op
assuming that the disturbances are independently distributed. From (1) and
(3), the asymptotic variance of output is
a =(a2o + b2o,,, + o)M.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 295
The asymptotic covariance of price and output is simply
(5) a2
Footnote
Where the balance of tradeisgoverned by B= -xp-f3y,, then the
unconditional covariance of B is
= Pd+ fJ2cr + 2txI3OPdYd.
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COMMENTS
'The International Monetary System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals'
by Marcus H. Miller and John Williamson
Stanley FISCHER
- This paper presents a formal model designed to analyze the two leading
alternative proposals to the current international monetary system, the
McKinnon proposal to return to fixed nominal rates, and the more subtle
and elusive Williamson proposal for target zones. The conclusions are
regrettably not crystal clear.
1. The proposals
McKinnon's proposal is the more conventional. In its original form it
proposed fixing the exchange rates among the U.S., Japan and Germany, and
fixing the growth rate of their combined money stock. The proposal reflected
his view that currency substitution was the main cause of exchange rate
changes.
McKinnon has moved away from the currency substitution emphasis in
more recent versions of the proposal. He now expects the three largest
countries basically to follow gold standard rules, manipulating short term
interest rates to defend the exchange rate. Presumably it would be the deficit
countries that would come under more pressure to pursue active monetary
policies. Money growth would be treated as an intermediate run target,
consistency with interest rate manipulation being attained by movements of
the average level of the nominal interest rate in the three countries.
Two other features should be noted: first, McKinnon's belief that appro-
priate exchange rates are provided by purchasing power parity calculations
and not by the need to attain current account balance; and second, his view
that the current account isessentially unaffected by the exchange rate.M.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 297
Accordingly, fiscal policy would have to be used to bring about current
account balance.
By contrast, Williamson's target zone proposal envisages setting exchange
rates to bring about current account balance. Central exchange rates, which
may crawl, are set by agreement. These rates adjust one for one with relative
inflation rates, and thus may be construed as real exchange rates. Wide,
± 1O%, bands around the central rate retain most of the virtues of the
floating rate system. But when the rate approaches the limits of the band,
action has to be taken. This may involve either monetary or fiscal policy,
though Williamson also leaves open the soft option of adjusting the target
zone. The benefits and disadvantages of this scheme have been extensively
discussed, in the 1986 Brookings Papers and elsewhere.1
Because the central rates can be viewed as fixedinreal terms, the
Williamson proposal is vulnerable to the charge, made by Adams and Gros,
that price levels become indeterminate. The paper implies that it is for this
reason Williamson has recently appended the assumption that fiscal policy
should be directed at a nominal income target. This is logically impeccable,
but in practice ensures that the proposal will not be accepted - for reasons
that I will discuss below. The problem of price-level indeterminacy should
not be regarded with as much solemnity as it evidently is by the authors - it
goes away if the target exchange rate is adjusted only by O.99% for every 1%
change in relative price levels.
However, there is a more serious reason to worry about fiscal policy. The
prime objection to the original Williamson target zone proposal was that
divergent fiscal policies (with the difference between the U.S. and the rest of
OECD in the early eighties in mind) could overwhelm the defenses of any
target zones. The modification of the proposal to include co-ordinated fiscal
policies deals appropriately with that difficulty, even if it does reduce the
likelihood of its adoption.
2. The analysis
One way of analyzing the alternative proposals is by simulation of a large-
scale econometric model. This was done in the paper by Edison, Miller and
Williamson. A difficulty in an exercise of this sort is modelling expectations,
particularly of the very non-linear Williamson proposal.
The alternative adopted hereisto use as simple a stochastic open
economy model as possible. The model consists of the ISLM apparatus, plus
an aggregate supply function and asset market relations determined by the
perfect mobility of capital plus an assumption about the existence of a fad.
1See 'Symposium on Exchange Rates, Trade, and Capital Flows', Brookings Papers on
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The determinisic component of the ISLM curves is standard. It is not
obvious though that the errors in those equations should be treated as white
noise - certainly velocity changes appear in practice to be quite persistent.
Such serially correlated shocks should be modelled, since they are certainly
relevant to the behavior of the system under money targeting. The aggregate
supply relationship omits any exchange rate effects on costs: these could be
incorporated with little additional complexity. The aggregate supply function
includes a term in p that represents a core inflation rate, but that ends up in
some versions of the model as the growth rate of money. Although this
assumption has been made by Buiter and Miller in earlier work, it is hardly
persuasive; expectations are not well handled in this theoretical model.
The authors are obviously pleased with the inclusion of the fad com-
ponents in the interest rate equalization equation. It serves to complicate the
analysis of the floating rate regime, and is interesting. However, the authors
fail to make clear its contribution to the comparison among the different
policies.
Although the Williamson proposal focuses on the current account, there is
no current account equation in this model. Similarly, there is no accounting
for reserves, implying that the treatment of the McKinnon proposal is biased
in its favor.
The authors use the sum and difference method of Aoki to carry out the
analysis. By making the two countries identical they abstract from divergent
productivity trends, divergent inflation preferences, and differences in wage
and price flexibility in the countries. All these are an important part of the
case for flexible exchange rates. Their inclusion would strengthen the case for
the existing system or the Williamson proposal over the McKinnon proposal.
The authors take the view that the fads would not be present in the
Williamson and McKinnon worlds. I certainly believe that something like the
fads of this paper are partly a result of uncertainty of market participants
about the exchange rate intentions of governments, but itis doubtful that
such movements would disappear if there was a shift to exchange rate
targeting or fixing. Rather the fads would be reflected in attacks on the fixed
exchange rate or on the edges of the target zones.
The results of the analysis simply do not emerge clearly. It appears that
McKinnon and Williamson emerge more or less tied. Table 5 at the end gives
comparisons for one set of parameter values, but regrettably no indication of
the robustness of the results.
3. General comments
All economists have suffered through the joke about the physicist, engineer
and economist marooned on a desert island with a can of food but no can
opener. The economist's solution to the problem begins 'Assume a can-M.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 299
opener'. This paper has a can-opener of that typeinit,namely the
assumption in the Williamson proposal that fiscal policy is operated to target
nominal income.
The main cause of exchange rate movements in the last five years has been
U.S. fiscal policy. If fiscal policy had been directed to a nominal income
target over the last five years, the Williamson proposal would not now be
receiving the serious attention it is.
The key question about the McKinnon and Williamson proposals is
whether the choice of the exchange rate system will constrain domestic policy
choices. The answer for some European countries evident from the EMS is
yes. It still seems unlikely though that the U.S. Congress orAdministraton
will allow itself to be constrained. It was the failure of the U.S. to constrain
its policies in the late sixties that led to the failure of the Bretton Woods
system. There has been no indication subsequently that the U.S. is prepared
to modify its behavior in a way that would make either fixed exchange rates
or greater exchange rate fixity more likely. That is so despite the Plaza and
Louvre agreements - for there has been no evidence that the Administration
as opposed to the Secretary of the Treasury plans to adjust fiscalpolicy.
Perhaps all that will change in 1989, but don't bet on it.
This paper has one other failing. It represents the Williamson proposal as
one that uses monetary policy to fix the real exchange rate while fiscalpolicy
targets nominal income. None of the subtlety of the proposal's combination
of fixed and flexible rates appears here. That is undoubtedly very difficult.
But in justice to Williamson the authors should make the attempt, perhaps
through simulation of a theoretical model.
COMMENTS
'The International Monetary System: An Analysis of Alternative Regimes'
by Marcus H. Miller and John Williamson
Gilles OUDIZ
Marcus Miller and John Williamson have written an attractive paper which
applies up to date macroeconomic analysis to the discussion of International
Monetary Coordination. The author's objective is to study within a single
formal framework the proposals of R. McKinnon and J. Williamson for
monetary reform.
We will briefly discuss here the 'technical' aspects of the paper: the model
and the policy coordination framework, before commenting on the con-
clusions of the authors.300 M.H.Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system
The model of a two country world
The basic equations of the world economy model follow closely the
'standard' literature in open economy macroeconomics and do not need
much comment.
However the authors introduce a more original specification of exchange
rate determination. The introduction of 'fads', modelled as a 'coloured noise'
process, within the traditional arbitrage equation aims at taking into account
the actual working of exchange markets.
The authors are unfortunately quite short on the motivations of their
choice which seems largely ad-hoc. Further in the paper this technicality is
assumed away partly becauseit complicates the formal analysis, partly
because the introduction of monetary coordination is supposed to eliminate
these fads.
The policy framework
Using a technique developed by Aoki (1981) the authors analyze separ-
ately the behavior of average and differential economic variables.
Far from being strictly technical this choice has in fact an interesting
econonomic interpretation. The model of averages - i.e., the global economy
- behaves like a closed economy without any exchange rate problem whereas
themodelof differencesfocusesonthe problem of exchangerate
management.
Let us consider a very simple two country model of the world economy to
make this point clearer.
Let the model of the home country be:
M(m, y, p, m*, p*, e) = 0,
with the notations of the authors.
Let us further consider that the authorities of the home country choose
their monetary policy so as to minimize the following loss function:
L=y2+p2.
The foreign country's behavior is assumed to be determined by a symmetri-
cal model and loss function:
M*(m*, y*, p*, m, y, p,- e) = 0,
L* =y*2+ cbp*2.M.H. Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system 301






Taking into account the fact that
O.5LlO.5L* =La+Ld,
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L0= y + 4p,
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The problem of a supranational authority having to determine an optimal
coordinated monetary policy is thus twofold: the determination of the global
level of output and prices through the management of the world money
supply, m, and the management of internationaldifferencesthrough
exchange rate policy, ma.
This separability of the world economy model is thus meaningful under
two quite restrictive assumptions:
- the world economy is symmetrical,
- economic policy is controlled by asupranational authority (or jointly by
the two national authorities through policy coordination) which allows for302 M.H.Miller and J. Williamson, The international monetary system
the separate management of average, and differentiallevels of policy
instruments.
The first assumption is clearly not granted at the world levelif one
considersthethree major groups of industrialized economies:U.S.A.,
Japan and Europe. As the authors acknowledge, it is not granted among
European economies either.
The second assumption is more fundamental for it raises the question of
the strategic framework within which the world economic policy is set.
A major weakness of Miller and Williamson's paper is the absence of a
properly specified welfare analysis. We have no way of knowing whether the
two countries are worse off or better off with either monetary coordination
proposals. Nor does the formal analysis explicitly specify how the average
and differential levels of policy instruments are set.
To put it in less technical terms, it does not suffice to state that the
exchange rate is fixed. The policy framework is essential in this respect. A
fully developed welfare analysis will yield different results depending on
whether this fixed exchange rate level is set by a single dominant country or
jointly through policy coordination.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and
recent European experience show that thisisfar from being a merely
academic consideration.
3. Concluding remarks
The idea of applying recent developments in international macroeconomics
literature to the discussion of exchange rate reform is by all means appealing
to specialists in both fields.
Following a previous paper which emphasized empirical simulations, the
authors have attempted to derive analytically some meaningful conclusions
on the advantages of McKinnon's and Williamson's proposals.
However the discussion which they provide falls short of being really
convincing. Their sophisticated dynamic analysis remains ad hoc. It does not
provide easily understandable conclusions and the strategic interaction of the
two countries - conflict or cooperation? - remains unclear.
In short this paper is welcome as a much needed attempt at sorting out
formally the arguments in favour of international monetary reform proposals,
but further research will be needed along the lines pioneered by the authors.